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By Daniel Harris 
ABSTRACT—The big surprise on the U.S. Supreme Court during the October 
2018 term was how often the Court’s newest members disagreed with each 
other. In cases with at least one dissent, Justice Neil Gorsuch and Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh were on opposite sides 49% of the time. Frequently, one or 
the other joined with the Court’s four Democratic appointees, resulting in 
liberal victories in cases involving federal business regulation and federal 
criminal law. 
There is a pattern to the disagreements between the new appointees—
the two Justices have profoundly different attitudes toward the federal 
government. Justice Kavanaugh has a positive view of the federal 
government. As a result, he tends to resolve ambiguities in favor of the 
government and the exercise of federal power. Justice Gorsuch, on the other 
hand, has a skeptical attitude toward federal power. He resolves doubts 
against the government and the exercise of federal power. As a practical 
matter, this means that Justice Kavanaugh is a potential liberal ally in federal 
regulatory cases and Justice Gorsuch is a likely ally in federal criminal cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Confounding expectations, the U.S Supreme Court’s four Democratic 
appointees did surprisingly well during the October 2018 term,1 significantly 
increasing their overall winning percentages from the previous term.2 
Whether that success rate will continue in the future is hard to say, for it 
depends on the mix of cases that the Court decides to hear as well as other 
considerations. But one factor working in favor of the Democratic appointees 
seems likely to persist. That factor, the subject of this Essay, is the different 
jurisprudential outlooks of Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch. 
Although they were expected to have similar voting patterns,3 the 
Court’s newest members often disagreed with each other.4 In cases with at 
least one dissent, Justice Brett Kavanaugh and Justice Neil Gorsuch were on 
opposite sides 49% of the time.5 Their splits did not track the familiar right 
to left political spectrum, and both were willing to vote with the Court’s 
 
 1 See Adam Liptak & Alicia Parlapiano, A Supreme Court Term Marked by Shifting Alliances and 
Surprise Votes, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/us/supreme-court-
decisions.html [https://perma.cc/K7SB-G68V] (“The Supreme Court term that ended on Thursday was 
expected to be a blood bath for its four-member liberal wing. Instead, shifting alliances produced a series 
of surprising liberal victories. . . . [T]he [C]ourt’s liberals had far more success than they did last term, 
when Justice Anthony M. Kennedy was still on the [C]ourt.”). 
 2 FINAL STAT PACK FOR THE OCTOBER 2018 TERM 24 (2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/StatPack_OT18-7_30_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WWX-UKXQ] (showing that 
during the October 2018 Term, the conservative justices won only 41% of ideologically conservative 5–
4 decisions; by contrast, during the October 2017 Term, the conservatives won 100% of ideologically 
conservative 5–4 decisions). 
 3 See Jeremy Kidd, New Metrics and the Politics of Judicial Selection, 70 ALA. L. REV. 785, 803–04 
(2019) (showing through quantitative analysis that Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh had very 
similar conservative predictive scores). 
 4 See Robert Barnes, They’re Not ‘Wonder Twins’: Gorsuch, Kavanaugh Shift the Supreme Court, 
but Their Differences are Striking, WASH. POST (June 29, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/theyre-not-wonder-twins-gorsuch-kavanaugh-
shift-the-supreme-court-but-their-differences-are-striking/2019/06/28/63754902-99b6-11e9-916d-
9c61607d8190_story.html [https://perma.cc/9YZ5-9V7L] (“Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have disagreed 
more than any pair of new justices chosen by the same president in decades.”). 
 5 FINAL STAT PACK FOR THE OCTOBER 2018 TERM, supra note 2, at 24. 
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Democratic appointees. Justice Kavanaugh voted with Obama appointee 
Justice Elena Kagan 70% of the time in all cases, and 51% of the time in 
divided cases (just as often as he agreed with Justice Gorsuch).6 In the cases 
decided five to four, Justice Gorsuch voted with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
35% of the time and with Justice Sonia Sotomayor 35% of the time.7 
This Essay argues that there is a pattern to the disagreements between 
Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch that is clear from their Supreme 
Court opinions and is likely to impact their votes for many years to come. 
Specifically, the two Justices have fundamentally different attitudes toward 
the federal government and the scope of federal power. 
Justice Kavanaugh, who has lived in the Washington D.C. area for 
almost all of his life and has spent his career working for the federal 
government,8 has a positive, Hamiltonian, insider view of the federal 
government and federal power. As will be shown below, he tends to resolve 
ambiguities in its favor. Justice Kavanaugh embraces jurisprudential 
philosophies that treat government as a force for good and believes laws 
should be construed pragmatically to benefit society. He is apt to vote with 
the liberal justices in federal regulatory cases in which the weak seek the 
protection of federal law. 
Justice Gorsuch hails from Colorado. His mother, Anne Gorsuch, came 
under sharp criticism for her deregulatory efforts as President Reagan’s 
Director of the Environmental Protection Agency in the early 1980s.9 As this 
Essay will show, Justice Gorsuch has a skeptical, Jeffersonian, outsider view 
of the federal government and federal power. He likes to resolve doubts 
against it. Justice Gorsuch subscribes to theories of jurisprudence that tend 
to restrain federal power, such as the traditional common law, separation of 
powers and originalism. He is apt to vote with the Court’s liberal justices in 
federal criminal cases and other matters in which the weak seek protection 
from federal law. 
This Essay will illustrate the differences between the two Justices by 
looking at the four Supreme Court cases in which they were on opposite sides 
and both wrote substantial opinions. The first two are cases in which Justice 
Kavanaugh was in the majority and Justice Gorsuch was in dissent. The last 
two are cases in which Justice Gorsuch was on the winning side while Justice 
Kavanaugh was in dissent. These four cases illustrate the different 
philosophies of the two Justices pertaining to federal power: One 
Hamiltonian seeking to increase federal power and the other Jeffersonian 
 
 6 See id. 
 7 See id. 
 8 See MOLLIE HEMINGWAY & CARRIE SEVERINO, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 9, 95 (2019). 
 9 See id. at 59–60. 
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seeking to limit federal power. They provide some indication of when each 
Justice might be willing to cross the aisle and vote with the Democratic 
appointees on the Court. 
I. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH PREVAILS OVER JUSTICE GORSUCH 
A. Apple Inc. v. Pepper 
An excellent example of how Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch 
differ when it comes to construing the breadth of federal power is Apple Inc. 
v. Pepper,10 an antitrust case. Apple required that applications (“apps”) for 
Apple devices be sold through its app store. The app developers set the prices 
for the apps, but Apple imposed a uniform 30% commission.11 
Several consumers sued Apple, alleging that the company was a 
monopolist in violation of the Sherman Act and unlawfully used its 
monopoly power to charge customers higher prices than the customers would 
have paid in a competitive market. In response, Apple argued that its actions 
were not the proximate cause of the prices the customers were charged 
because those prices were set by the various app developers and not by 
Apple.12 
The company invoked a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court precedent, Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois,13 which held that only direct purchasers have standing 
to sue for damages under the federal antitrust laws.14 Apple argued that the 
consumer plaintiffs were analogous to indirect purchasers because they were 
suing a party that did not set the prices for allegedly causing the antitrust 
injury. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California agreed 
with Apple and dismissed the case.15 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that the consumers were direct purchasers within 
the meaning of Illinois Brick and therefore had standing to sue.16 The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether to adopt a liberal 
construction of the Sherman Act and a narrow construction of the Illinois 
Brick exception, as the plaintiffs wanted, or conversely, a narrow 
construction of the Sherman Act, a broad construction of the Illinois Brick 
 
 10 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019). 
 11 Id. at 1519. 
 12 Id. 
 13 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 14 Id. at 745–46; Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1520. 
 15 See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169836, *22 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 
2013). 
 16 See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 325 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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exception, and a common law proximate cause requirement, as Apple 
urged.17 
The Supreme Court sided with the consumer plaintiffs by a vote of five 
to four and affirmed the Ninth Circuit. The majority consisted of the Court’s 
four Democratic appointees plus Justice Kavanaugh, who wrote the majority 
opinion.18 A key theme in the opinion was that the Sherman Act should be 
construed so as to fulfill its purpose of protecting consumers from 
monopolists. Early on, the opinion described the plaintiffs’ allegations as 
stating a classic antitrust claim.19 The majority then noted that immunizing 
monopolistic retailers from an antitrust suit whenever the retailers had their 
suppliers set the base prices would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. 
“We refuse to rubber-stamp such a blatant evasion of statutory text and 
judicial precedent,”20 the majority said. 
Justice Kavanaugh brushed aside Apple’s practical arguments that 
Apple could still be sued by its suppliers and that determining damages was 
too complex. That Apple could also be sued as a monopolist by its suppliers 
was of no matter: “Leaving consumers at the mercy of monopolistic retailers 
simply because upstream suppliers could also sue the retailers makes little 
sense and would directly contradict the longstanding goal of effective private 
enforcement and consumer protection in antitrust cases.”21 The potential 
complexity of damage calculations was also immaterial.22 
In closing, Justice Kavanaugh returned to the theme that the Sherman 
Act should be interpreted so as to accomplish its pro-consumer purpose. He 
stated: “The plaintiffs seek to hold retailers to account if the retailers engage 
in unlawful anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers who purchase 
from those retailers. That is why we have antitrust law.”23 The opinion went 
on: “Ever since Congress overwhelmingly passed and President Benjamin 
Harrison signed the Sherman Act in 1890, ‘protecting consumers from 
monopoly prices’ has been ‘the central concern of antitrust.’”24 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a dissent, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts 
and Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.25 Justice Gorsuch 
interpreted Illinois Brick broadly to prohibit pass-on theories of damages in 
 
 17 Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1519. 
 18 Id. at 1518, 1525. 
 19 Id. at 1519. 
 20 Id. at 1523–24. 
 21 Id. at 1524. 
 22 Id. (“Illinois Brick is not a get-out-of-court-free card for monopolistic retailers to play any time 
that a damages calculation might be complicated.”). 
 23 Id. at 1525. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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accordance with the general rule that statutory causes of action are “limited 
to plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the 
statute.”26 Justice Gorsuch went on to argue that the Court’s decision 
replaced the sensible proximate cause standard with a formalistic rule that 
ignored economic reality.27 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent placed great weight on the practical 
difficulties of adjudicating the plaintiffs’ antitrust claim, asking: “Will the 
court hear testimony to determine the market power of each app developer, 
how each set its prices, and what it might have charged consumers for apps 
if Apple’s commission had been lower?”28 Justice Gorsuch also chided 
Justice Kavanaugh for preferring the text of the Sherman Act to common law 
principles limiting liability, arguing that instead the Court should follow 
Illinois Brick and “the well-trodden path of construing the statutory text in 
light of background common law principles of proximate cause.”29 
For purposes of this Essay, the important takeaway from the Apple case 
is how differently the two Trump appointees approached federal regulation. 
Justice Kavanaugh supported a broad reading of a federal statute while 
Justice Gorsuch preferred limiting principles taken from common law 
traditions. Justice Kavanaugh sympathized with the people the statute was 
intended to protect. He had much less concern for alleged lawbreakers. By 
contrast, Justice Gorsuch was supportive of a doctrine from the traditional 
common law that limits the reach of federal liability and protects parties 
subject to federal regulation. 
B. Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries 
A similar conflict between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch took 
place in Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries,30 a case involving the 
application of federal maritime law to a products liability claim. Plaintiffs 
Kenneth McAfee and John DeVries were exposed to asbestos while serving 
in the U.S. Navy (one in the 1950s, the other in the 1980s). They later 
developed cancer, allegedly as a result of their asbestos exposure.31 The 
plaintiffs could not sue the Navy because of a 1950 Supreme Court precedent 
and they were unable to sue the asbestos manufacturers because those 
 
 26 Id. at 1527 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 
(2014)). 
 27 Id. at 1526. 
 28 Id. at 1528. 
 29 Id. at 1530. 
 30 139 S. Ct. 986 (2019). 
 31 See id. at 991. 
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companies were in bankruptcy.32 So, instead, the former sailors and their 
wives filed suit in Pennsylvania state court against the companies that had 
supplied the Navy with products such as pumps, blowers, and turbines to 
which the Navy had later added asbestos. The theory of liability was that the 
defendant companies should have warned the Navy about the dangers of 
asbestos insulation, so that the plaintiffs would have known to wear 
respiratory masks and could have avoided the hazard.33 
The defendants removed the cases to federal court because the cases fell 
within the federal maritime jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted the defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment, relying on the traditional common law “bare-metal 
defense,” followed in many jurisdictions, under which product 
manufacturers have no duty to warn about the dangers of materials that are 
not in their products at the time of sale.34 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed in accordance with a modern products liability rule, 
followed in some jurisdictions, that requires manufacturers to warn about the 
dangers of added materials if it is foreseeable that the materials might be 
added to the product after sale.35 Thus, the court of appeals rejected the 
traditional common law limit on liability followed by the district court in 
favor of holding the defendant manufacturers potentially liable under a more 
modern and expansive theory of product liability. 
On review, the Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs by a vote of six 
to three. But instead of following the Third Circuit’s reasoning, the Supreme 
Court adopted a somewhat less plaintiff-friendly modern rule, followed in 
some jurisdictions, under which  
[A] product manufacturer has a duty to warn when (i) its product requires 
incorporation of a part, (ii) the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that 
the integrated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and (iii) 
the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users will realize 
that danger.36 
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kavanaugh and joined by 
Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s four Democratic appointees. Justice 
Kavanaugh began his analysis by noting that in maritime cases the federal 
 
 32 See id. at 992 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950) (barring service members 
from suing the federal government for service-related injuries)). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Devries v. Gen. Elec. Co., 188 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2016); McAfee v. 20th 
Century Glove Corp. of Texas, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75886 (E.D. Pa. June 10, 2015). 
 35 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liability Litig., 873 F.3d 232, 234 (3rd Cir. 2017); see also Air and 
Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 992. 
 36 Air and Liquid Sys. Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 991. 
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courts act as common law courts with the same power to make law that state 
courts have “in state common-law cases.”37 Justice Kavanaugh went on to 
emphasize that federal courts did not have to stick with traditional common 
law rules but instead could examine a wide variety of sources, including 
scholarly writings, treatises, legislation, and opinions of other courts, in 
deciding how to shape maritime law.38 
Justice Kavanaugh concluded that what he described as the intermediate 
approach offered the best rule. Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that because 
products can be used in so many ways with so many other products and with 
so many possible bad combinations, the foreseeability test adopted by the 
Third Circuit would be too costly and would lead to “overwarning” users 
(that is, a mind-numbingly long list of everything that might go wrong).39 On 
the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh opined that the bare-metal defense 
followed by the district court would not do enough to force warnings and 
promote safety.40 Justice Kavanaugh reasoned that the intermediate test 
would not raise the practicability concerns of the foreseeability test, noting 
that the Court was not aware of “substantial overwarning problems” in the 
jurisdictions that follow the intermediate approach.41 
Justice Kavanaugh added a revealing policy reason for siding with the 
plaintiffs, stating: “Maritime law has always recognized a ‘special solicitude 
for the welfare’ of those who undertake to ‘venture upon hazardous and 
unpredictable sea voyages.’”42 Justice Kavanaugh went on: “The plaintiffs in 
this case are the families of veterans who served in the U. S. Navy. Maritime 
law’s longstanding solicitude for sailors reinforces our decision to require a 
warning in these circumstances.”43 Thus, Justice Kavanaugh treated helping 
the weak (in this case, sailors and their families) as a legitimate reason to 
expand federal liability, taking a positive and activist view of federal power. 
Justice Gorsuch wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. 
He argued that the test adopted by the majority did not enjoy “meaningful 
roots in the common law.”44 Citing the Restatement (Third) of Torts from 
1997, Justice Gorsuch noted that “it is black-letter law that the supplier of a 
product generally must warn about only those risks associated with the 
 
 37 Id. at 992. 
 38 Id. at 992 (“In formulating federal maritime law, the federal courts may examine, among other 
sources, judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings.”). 
 39 Id. at 994. 
 40 Id. at 994–95. 
 41 Id. at 995. 
 42 Id.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 997 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
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product itself, not those associated with the ‘products and systems into which 
[it later may be] integrated.’”45 
Justice Gorsuch argued that the common law rule made the most sense 
from the standpoint of economic efficiency because manufacturers are the 
ones who know their products best and therefore should be the ones who 
have the duty to warn about product hazards.46 Justice Gorsuch also argued 
that the traditional common law was more consistent with consumer 
expectations through examples:  
A home chef who buys a butcher’s knife may expect to read warnings about the 
dangers of knives but not about the dangers of undercooked meat. Likewise, a 
purchaser of gasoline may expect to see warnings at the pump about its 
flammability but not about the dangers of recklessly driving a car.47 
Justice Gorsuch criticized the majority for replacing a clear common 
law rule with an opaque standard that will be difficult to administer. He then 
raised a fairness argument that the majority had not considered, noting that 
the defendants were being sued over products they had sold decades earlier 
and that the defendants had provided all the warnings at the time that the law 
then required. Now, the Court was imposing a new duty on them to warn “to 
warn about other people’s products. It is a duty they could not have 
anticipated then and one they cannot discharge now. They can only pay.”48 
Justice Gorsuch went on to argue that the Court  
[M]ay be motivated by the unfortunate facts of this particular case, where the 
sailors’ widows appear to have a limited prospect of recovery from the 
companies that supplied the asbestos (they’ve gone bankrupt) and from the 
Navy that allegedly directed the use of asbestos (it’s likely immune under our 
precedents).49  
Nevertheless, he continued, sympathy for the plaintiffs and the Court’s 
desire to provide them a source of recovery did not justify imposing liability 
on the defendant manufacturers for conduct that was lawful at the time they 
acted.50 
Once again, Justice Kavanaugh sympathized with those needing the 
protection of federal law. Justice Gorsuch’s sympathies were with those 
 
 45 Id. (alteration in original). 
 46 Id. (“By contrast, we dilute the incentive of a manufacturer to warn about the dangers of its 
products when we require other people to share the duty to warn and its corresponding costs.”). 
 47 Id. at 998. 
 48 Id. at 999. 
 49 Id. at 1000. 
 50 Id. (“[H]ow were they supposed to anticipate many decades ago the novel duty to warn placed on 
them today? People should be able to find the law in the books; they should not find the law coming upon 
them out of nowhere.”). 
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needing protection from federal law. Consistent with his pragmatic approach 
and comfort with federal power, Justice Kavanaugh supported judicial 
innovation on behalf of the disadvantaged. Taking a modern, consumer 
protective view of the evolving common law, Justice Kavanaugh wanted the 
federal government to take an active role (through the federal courts) in 
helping the weak, even if that meant upsetting the settled expectations of 
business. Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, thought that it was wrong for the 
federal courts to make up new legal duties and then punish people for 
violating rules that did not exist at the time the defendants engaged in the 
challenged conduct. What Justice Kavanaugh regarded as beneficial 
activism, Justice Gorsuch saw as the overreach of arbitrary government. For 
Justice Gorsuch, courts should resist the temptation to do good with other 
people’s money. Accordingly, Justice Gorsuch favored the traditional 
common law even if that meant sympathetic plaintiffs would go without a 
recovery. 
II. JUSTICE GORSUCH PREVAILS OVER JUSTICE KAVANAUGH 
The differences between Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Gorsuch did 
not track the familiar right to left political spectrum. Sometimes, Justice 
Gorsuch’s anti-federal government approach led him to side with the 
underdog and the Court’s Democratic appointees, while Justice Kavanaugh’s 
pro-government stance put him on the same side as the Court’s other 
Republican appointees. Here are two examples. 
A. United States v. Davis 
While brandishing a short-barreled shotgun, Maurice Davis and Andre 
Glover committed a string of gas station robberies in Texas.51 They were 
caught, prosecuted in federal court and convicted of (1) violations of the 
federal Hobbs Act; (2) using or carrying a firearm in connection with their 
Hobbs Act crimes; (3) conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act; and (4) using or 
carrying a firearm in connection with their Hobbs Act conspiracy.52 The 
question before the Supreme Court involved the fourth charge. 
The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), made it a crime to use or 
carry a firearm in connection with a federal “crime of violence.”53 A crime 
of violence was defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). There were two alternative 
definitions. According to subsection (A), a crime of violence was a felony 
that had “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” as one 
 
 51 United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). 
 52 See id. at 2324. 
 53 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
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of its elements.54 Alternatively, according to subsection (B), a crime of 
violence was a felony “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the 
course of committing the offense.”55 
The Government could justify the defendants’ convictions for carrying 
or using a firearm in connection with their Hobbs Act violations under 
subsection (A) because the use or threatened use of force was an element of 
that crime. But the Government could not justify the defendants’ convictions 
for carrying or using a firearm in connection with the conspiracy charge 
because the use or threatened use of force was not an element of conspiracy. 
Those convictions had to be justified under subsection (B).56 
The Government faced three big problems. First, subsection (B) had 
been construed, both by the courts and the Government, to require the 
“categorical” approach: an inquiry into the potential for harm inherent in the 
category of offense that the defendant committed (for example, is mail fraud 
the type of crime that has a substantial risk of harm?).57 Second, the Supreme 
Court held in 2018 in Sessions v. Dimaya that a virtually identical statutory 
definition of a crime of violence mandated that same categorical approach.58 
Third, and most troublesome for the Government, in Dimaya, the Supreme 
Court held that the categorical approach was unconstitutionally vague 
because it required courts “to picture the kind of conduct that the crime 
involves in the ordinary case, and to judge whether that abstraction presents 
some not-well-specified-yet-sufficiently-large degree of risk.”59 
To save the convictions and the statute, the Government asked the 
Supreme Court to get rid of the vagueness problem by reinterpreting 
subsection (B) so that its definition of a crime of violence would depend on 
what defendants actually did and not on the hypothetical potential for harm 
associated with their category of crime.60 The Supreme Court, in a five to 
four decision, rejected the Government’s request. The five Justices in the 
majority were the Court’s four Democratic appointees plus Justice Neil 
Gorsuch, who wrote the majority opinion. 
Consistent with his originalist approach, Justice Gorsuch began his 
opinion by setting forth his deductions from the founding principles of the 
republic. Justice Gorsuch noted that in our constitutional order only 
 
 54 § 924(c)(3)(A). 
 55 § 924(c)(3)(B); see Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2324. 
 56 § 924(c)(3)(B). 
 57 See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2326. 
 58 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211, 1214–16 (2018). 
 59 Id. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 60 Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2327. 
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Congress can define federal crimes and those definitions have to be clear 
enough to give people fair notice of what the law prohibits.61 He further 
stated that vague laws violate these principles because they hand off the 
responsibility of defining criminal behavior “to unelected prosecutors and 
judges” and because they “leave people with no sure way to know what 
consequences will attach to their conduct.”62 The Supreme Court, he 
continued, could not fix vague laws by rewriting them because that is a 
function reserved for the legislature.63 
Applying these principles to the case at hand, Justice Gorsuch stated 
that subsection (B) meant a crime of violence was to be determined using the 
categorical approach, which involved assessing the potential for harm 
associated with the abstract category of the defendant’s offense. Because this 
inquiry provided “no reliable way to determine which offenses qualify as 
crimes of violence,” the section was “unconstitutionally vague.”64 
Justice Gorsuch further explained that while the Government’s 
alternative reading of the statute would cure the vagueness problem, it could 
not “be squared with the statute’s text, context, and history.”65 Were the 
Supreme Court to adopt the Government’s revised version of the statute, 
Justice Gorsuch said, the Supreme Court Justices would be stepping outside 
their role “as judges and writing a new law rather than applying the one 
Congress adopted.”66 
Justice Gorsuch also noted that the Government’s new reading of 
subsection (B) would criminalize some conduct that was not made criminal 
by the law as it was actually written (such as a defendant’s use of a firearm 
in connection with an offense that does not normally involve the use of 
force). Expanding the statute through interpretation “would risk offending 
the very same due process and separation-of-powers principles on which the 
vagueness doctrine itself rests.”67 Therefore, despite the general reluctance 
of courts to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, “a court may not, in 
order to save Congress the trouble of having to write a new law, construe a 
criminal statute to penalize conduct it does not clearly proscribe.”68 
Thus, Justice Gorsuch was not willing to rewrite the law in order to save 
it from being struck down as unconstitutionally vague. For Justice Gorsuch, 
 
 61 Id. at 2323. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 2323–24. 
 64 Id. at 2324. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 2333. 
 68 Id. 
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the top priority was preserving the rule of law and separation of powers, even 
if that meant some criminals did not receive all the punishment that Congress 
may have wanted them to receive. 
Justice Kavanaugh wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and 
Alito and in part by Chief Justice Roberts. Rather than adverting to the 
governing principles of a free society, as Justice Gorsuch had done, Justice 
Kavanaugh focused on the practical needs of modern American society. 
Citing crime statistics, Justice Kavanaugh noted how violent crime became 
a serious problem in America in the last third of the twentieth century.69 
Justice Kavanaugh went on to explain how the challenged law, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c), was passed in response to the demands of the American people and 
how since its passage thirty-three years ago, “violent crime with firearms has 
decreased significantly.”70 
Justice Kavanaugh then attacked as surprising and extraordinary the 
Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a key provision of § 924(c), “a 
federal law that has been applied so often for so long with so little problem.”71 
He warned that the Court’s decision “will make it harder to prosecute violent 
gun crimes in the future” and will release those convicted of violent gun 
crimes earlier than specified by Congress when it enacted § 924(c).72 
Justice Gorsuch devoted a section of his majority opinion to respond to 
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent.73 He responded to Justice Kavanaugh’s first 
argument by saying that there was nothing surprising or extraordinary about 
striking down a statute that even the Government conceded was 
unconstitutional, even if it continued to be interpreted as it had been 
interpreted through thousands of prosecutions. On the contrary, Justice 
Gorsuch said, it would be surprising and extraordinary if the Supreme Court 
could save the statute by suddenly giving it “a new meaning different from 
the one it has borne for the last three decades.”74 
In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh argued that the most sensible 
interpretation of a statute such as § 924(c)(3)(B), that imposes enhanced 
penalties on defendants who use a firearm in connection with a crime of 
violence, was to focus on what the defendant had actually done and not to 
employ the categorical approach of looking at the potential for harm 
associated with the abstract crime.75 Justice Kavanaugh quoted a lower court 
 
 69 Id. at 2336 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 70 Id. at 2337. 
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 73 Id. at 2333–36. 
 74 Id. at 2333. 
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opinion: “If you were to ask John Q. Public whether a particular crime posed 
a substantial risk of violence, surely he would respond, ‘Well, tell me how it 
went down—what happened?’”76 Justice Gorsuch responded by noting that 
the language of the statute before the Supreme Court wasn’t “the language 
posited in the dissent’s push poll. [Subsection (B)] doesn’t ask about the risk 
that ‘a particular crime posed’ but about the risk that an ‘offense . . . by its 
nature, involves.’”77 
Justice Kavanaugh said that it was irrelevant that the Government had 
for many years taken the position that subsection (B) mandated the (now 
unconstitutional) categorical approach. He noted that the Government only 
adopted that position “after the courts settled” on the categorical approach 
and that the Government took the position at a time “when it did not matter 
for constitutional vagueness purposes.”78 In response, Justice Gorsuch asked: 
“Isn’t it at least a little revealing that, when the government had no motive 
to concoct an alternative reading, even it thought the best reading of 
§ 924(c)(3)(B) demanded a categorical analysis?”79 
Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent noted that the word “offense” in subsection 
(B) could be read to refer to what the defendant had actually done,80 and that 
under a canon of statutory construction, ambiguous statutes must be 
interpreted to avoid unconstitutionality.81 Therefore, Justice Kavanaugh 
argued, the statutory definition of a crime of violence should be interpreted 
to focus on the defendant’s actual conduct because that reading would 
eliminate the vagueness problem and thus make the statute constitutional.82 
In response, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the dissent’s new reading 
of the law would criminalize conduct that was not criminal under the 
categorical approach, the interpretation that fit best with the statute’s 
language and history. Justice Gorsuch chided the dissent for not even trying 
to explain how criminalizing “conduct that isn’t criminal under the fairest 
reading of a statute might be reconciled with traditional principles of fair 
notice and separation of powers.”83 Justice Gorsuch noted that the dissent 
seemed willing to consign thousands of defendants to prison for a long time 
because it was “merely possible” that Congress might have ordained those 
 
 76 Id. (quoting Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Davis, 
139 S. Ct. at 2319).  
 77 Id. at 2334 (majority opinion).  
 78 Id. at 2355 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 79 Id. at 2334 (majority opinion).  
 80 Id. at 2346 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 81 Id. at 2349–50. 
 82 Id. at 2351. 
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penalties.84 Justice Gorsuch concluded: “In our republic, a speculative 
possibility that a man’s conduct violated the law should never be enough to 
justify taking his liberty.”85 
The last section of the dissent returned to the theme that the Court’s 
decision meant that “people who in the future commit violent crimes with 
firearms may be able to escape conviction under § 924(c).”86 Justice 
Kavanaugh argued that when the consequences of statutory interpretation are 
this bad, the Court should double-check its legal analysis.87 Accordingly, this 
double-checking would lead the Court to conclude that Justice Kavanaugh’s 
preferred (re)interpretation of the statute was reasonable.88 Justice 
Kavanaugh concluded: “I am not persuaded that the Court can blame this 
decision on Congress. The Court has a way out, if it wants a way out.”89 
The majority opinion by Justice Gorsuch challenged the dissent’s 
public policy arguments by questioning why Justice Kavanaugh would point 
out all the potential consequences if not to suggest that judges read the law 
to satisfy their policy goals.90 For Justice Gorsuch, the law should be 
interpreted in accordance with its language and original meaning, not given 
the interpretation that would best advance the judge’s idea of public policy. 
Justice Gorsuch went on to note the various ways Congress could fix the 
problem and then concluded that these options are within Congress’s 
purview, and it is not the role of the Court to write new statutes.91 
The Davis decision illustrates the philosophical differences between 
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch determined the 
meaning of the challenged law by looking at its language, history, and prior 
construction. He did not worry about whether this interpretation was 
consistent with sound public policy, the needs of law enforcement, or the 
objectives of Congress. By contrast, Justice Kavanaugh focused on the 
general statutory purpose and the practical consequences of alternative 
interpretations. He saw the judicial role as acting to benefit society and not 
just trying to find out the meaning of words used in a law. 
Justice Gorsuch resolved doubts about the meaning of the statute 
against the Government and in favor of liberty. He considered it immoral, 
and contrary to the basic principles of a free society, that people should be 
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punished based on the mere possibility that Congress might have wanted to 
proscribe what they had done. Justice Kavanaugh resolved ambiguities in 
favor of the Government and against wrongdoers. For him, it was wrong for 
the Court to ignore the public interest in law enforcement or the interest of 
society in deterring and punishing violent crime. 
Consistent with his originalist approach, Justice Gorsuch treated the 
law’s meaning as fixed, something courts were bound to follow whether or 
not they liked the consequences. Consistent with his pragmatic approach, 
Justice Kavanaugh saw the law’s meaning as something the Court could 
shape or alter to serve the public interest. 
B. Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. 
Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh were also on opposite sides of 
Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc.92 a five to 
four decision involving the interpretation of an 1855 treaty between the 
Yakama Nation and the U.S. Government. 
The State of Washington taxes motor vehicle fuel importers who bring 
large quantities of motor fuel into the state using ground transportation.93 The 
state sought to impose the tax on Cougar Den, a company owned by a 
member of the Yakama Nation and incorporated under Yakama law that 
trucked motor fuel over public highways to the Yakama reservation.94 
Cougar Den objected to the tax based on an 1855 treaty between the 
United States and the Yakama Nation. The treaty gave the United States ten 
million acres of Yakama land (a quarter of what is now the State of 
Washington) and gave members of the Yakama Nation certain rights in 
exchange. Among other things, the treaty promised the Yakamas “the right, 
in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public 
highways.”95 Cougar Den argued that this meant the Yakamas could import 
fuel by highway without being subject to state taxation. The State of 
Washington argued that the challenged law taxed the possession of motor 
fuel and did not violate the treaty.96 
By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court ruled for the Yakama fuel 
importer. The majority coalition consisted of the Court’s four Democratic 
appointees plus Justice Gorsuch. The main opinion on behalf of the fuel 
importer was a plurality opinion by Justice Breyer that was joined by Justice 
Kagan and Justice Sotomayor. Justice Breyer’s opinion limited its scope to 
 
 92 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000, 1001 (2019). 
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protecting the Yakamas from the state tax on fuel imported over public 
highways and was careful not to impugn state power over the Yakamas in a 
variety of other circumstances.97 
Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, which used more sweeping logic to decide in favor of the 
Yakamas. That opinion began by noting the long history of the Yakamas in 
the Pacific Northwest and that they gave up ten million acres of their land in 
exchange for rights under the 1855 treaty with the United States.98 Consistent 
with his originalist approach, Justice Gorsuch went on to describe the Court’s 
task as the “modest one” of construing the treaty to adopt “the interpretation 
most consistent with the treaty’s original meaning.”99 
Quoting precedent, Justice Gorsuch emphasized that the relevant 
meaning was not what the government might have understood but rather 
what the treaty meant to the Yakamas.100 Justice Gorsuch explained the 
reason for this rule: “After all, the United States drew up this contract, and 
we normally construe any ambiguities against the drafter who enjoys the 
power of the pen.”101 
Turning to the language of the treaty, Justice Gorsuch acknowledged 
that “[t]o some modern ears, the right to travel in common with others might 
seem merely a right to use the roads subject to the same taxes and regulations 
as everyone else.”102 But the modern understanding of the words did not 
matter, Justice Gorsuch went on, because that was not the Yakamas’ 
understanding at the time the 1855 treaty was signed.103 Citing binding, 
factual findings from another treaty case, Justice Gorsuch noted that in the 
“Yakama language, the term ‘in common with’ . . . suggest[ed] public use or 
general use without restriction.”104 This meant that the Yakamas understood 
the treaty to mean they could use the public highways without restriction. 
Justice Gorsuch went on to argue that this reading of the treaty made 
the most sense given the huge amount of land that the Yakamas surrendered 
in the deal. He noted that under the State’s interpretation, the treaty’s right 
to travel only promised tribal members “the right to venture out of their 
reservation and use the public highways like everyone else. But the record 
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shows that the consideration the Yakamas supplied was worth far more than 
an abject promise they would not be made prisoners on their reservation.”105 
Justice Gorsuch concluded that the case really told “an old and familiar 
story.”106 The federal government took millions of acres of tribal land in 
exchange for “a handful of modest promises.”107 Now the State was 
dissatisfied with the consequences of one of those promises.108 Justice 
Gorsuch gave the Supreme Court credit for holding the government to the 
terms of its deal, noting: “It is the least we can do.”109 
The main dissent was written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by 
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. Justice Kavanaugh also wrote a 
separate dissent that was joined by Justice Thomas. In that dissent, Justice 
Kavanaugh gave the treaty language a modern, commonsense interpretation. 
According to his dissent, “[t]he treaty’s ‘in common with’ language means 
what it says. The treaty recognizes tribal members’ right to travel on off-
reservation public highways on equal terms with other U.S. citizens.”110 
Justice Kavanaugh noted that in 1855 the government could have required 
the Yakamas to obtain special licenses before travelling off-reservation, so 
the Yakamas had reasons to agree to this deal.111 
Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged that, given this interpretation, the 
treaty might not have been a fair agreement for the Yakamas,112 but the 
Supreme Court could not fix that problem because “[a]s a matter of 
separation of powers, however, courts are bound by the text of the treaty.”113 
Furthermore, Justice Kavanaugh noted, Congress subsequently did many 
things to help the Yakamas, particularly since 1968.114 Therefore, Justice 
Kavanaugh concluded, “lament about the terms of the treaty negotiated by 
the Federal Government and the Tribe in 1855 does not support the Judiciary 
(as opposed to Congress and the President) rewriting the law in 2019.”115 
So, once again, we see profoundly different attitudes toward the federal 
government. In this case, as in the others, Justice Gorsuch resolved 
ambiguities against the federal government while Justice Kavanaugh 
 
 105 Id. at 1018. 
 106 Id. at 1021. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 1026 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. at 1027. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1027–28. The help included additional compensation and benefits beyond that specified in 
the treaty. 
 115 Id. at 1028. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E 
276 
resolved doubts in favor of the government. Justice Gorsuch saw the federal 
government as something of a predator in its dealing with the Yakamas. 
Justice Kavanaugh saw the government as their benefactor. 
And again, we see very different jurisprudential philosophies. Justice 
Gorsuch sought to enforce the treaty’s original meaning to aid those 
subjected to federal power, namely the Yakamas. They were the parties who 
had his sympathy. But Justice Gorsuch made it clear that he was not deciding 
based on sympathy. For Justice Gorsuch, the question was not what 
interpretation of the treaty would be most equitable or most consistent with 
modern sensibilities or represent the best public policy. The question, rather, 
was what the treaty meant to the Yakamas in 1855 in the Yakama language, 
with all doubts to be resolved against the federal government. As far as 
Justice Gorsuch was concerned, that meaning was the deal. The government 
could not welsh on the deal or try to modernize it to fit the government’s 
view of the larger public interest. 
By contrast, consistent with his pragmatic, dynamic, and pro-
government view of law, Justice Kavanaugh preferred the modern, 
commonsense understanding of the treaty text under which the government 
was free to impose nondiscriminatory taxes on the Yakamas. Justice 
Kavanaugh’s focus was on the present, what was fair in the here and now. 
He was not particularly interested in what the treaty might have meant to the 
Yakamas in 1855. 
CONCLUSION 
In the October 2018 term, the Supreme Court’s newest Justices were a 
study in contrasts. Justice Kavanaugh tended to resolve ambiguities in favor 
of the federal government and federal power. Justice Gorsuch resolved 
doubts the opposite way. Justice Kavanaugh favored a modern and pragmatic 
approach to the law. Justice Gorsuch preferred originalism, separation of 
powers, and the traditional common law. Justice Kavanaugh sympathized 
with those who needed the protection of federal power, while Justice 
Gorsuch’s sympathies were with those who needed protection from federal 
power. 
The differences between the two Justices are most likely to surface in 
cases involving the federal bureaucracy, federal regulation of business, and 
federal criminal law. In other areas, they are more likely to agree. Both, for 
example, are sympathetic to state and local governments. For instance, 
Justice Kavanaugh joined a plurality opinion by Justice Gorsuch upholding 
a Virginia statute prohibiting the mining of uranium.116 
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There is something else that the two Justices seem to have in common: 
Both followed their principles even when that meant voting against the more 
powerful party and siding with liberals and the weak. That consistency is 
good news for the Court’s four Democratic appointees because it means that 
the Court’s newest members are potential swing votes in cases involving 
federal authority. The new Justices’ willingness to vote for underdog parties 
is also a hopeful sign for those who prize equal justice under the law. 
